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With the exception of Saudi Arabia
and Iraq, the Arab coast of the gulf was ruled by ten families: in Kuwait
the Al Sabah; in Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the
present-day UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in Ajman, the Al
Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, the Al Qasimi in Ras al
Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn; and the Al Said in
present-day Oman. These families owed their positions to tribal leadership;
it was on this traditional basis that the British had negotiated treaties
with their leaders in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth
century.
A major provision of these treaties
was the recognition of sovereignty. The British were concerned that rulers
of the weaker gulf families would yield some of their territory under
pressure from more powerful groups, such as the Al Saud or the Ottomans.
Accordingly, the treaties signed between 1820 and 1916 recognized the
sovereignty of these rulers within certain borders and specified that these
borders could not be changed without British consent. Such arrangements
helped to put tribal alliances into more concrete terms of landownership.
This meant that the Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, not only
commanded the respect of tribes in the hinterland but also owned, as it
were, the land that those tribes used--in this case, about 72,000 square
kilometers of Arabia.
Controlling, or owning, land became
more important with the discovery of oil. When oil companies came to explore
for oil, they looked for the "owner" of the land; in accordance with British
treaties, they went to the area's leading families and agreed to pay fees to
the heads of these families. As oil revenues increased, the leaders became
rich. Although the leaders spent much of their new wealth on themselves,
they also distributed it in the area they controlled according to
traditional methods, which initially consisted mostly of largesse: gifts for
friends and food for whomever needed it. As time passed, the form of
largesse became more sophisticated and included, for example, the
construction of schools, hospitals, and roads to connect principal cities to
towns in the interior.
Oil revenues did not change
traditional tribal ideas about leadership. New money, however, increased the
influence of area leaders by giving them more resources to distribute.
Because of oil exploration, tribal boundaries became clearer, and areas were
defined more precisely. Distinctions among tribes also became more evident.
A new sense of identity appeared in gulf shaykhdoms and aroused a growing
expectation that they should rule themselves. To do this, shaykhs had to cut
themselves off from British control and protection.
By the early 1960s, this was
something to which the British had little objection. India and Pakistan won
their independence in 1947; this meant that Britain no longer had to worry
about protecting the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain was also
burdened by the tremendous sacrifices it made during World War II and could
not be as globally involved as it had been before the war. Therefore,
Britain yielded many of its strategic responsibilities to the United States
in the postwar period or gave them up entirely. However, the British were
bound to the gulf by treaties and so remained in the region, but it was
clear by the 1960s that they sought to leave the gulf.
Kuwait was the first state to
terminate the agreement connecting it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait
had developed more quickly than in neighboring states; as a result, Kuwaitis
were better prepared for independence. They declared independence in 1961
but ran into immediate trouble when Iraq claimed the territory. The Iraqis
argued that the British had recognized Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait
before World War I and, because the Ottomans had claimed to rule Kuwait from
what was then the province of Iraq, the territory should belong to Iraq.
The British immediately sent troops
to Kuwait to deter any Iraqi invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were
supported by the newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League), which
recognized the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab League move
left the Iraqis isolated and somewhat intimidated. Accordingly, when a new
Iraqi government came to power in 1963, one of its first steps was to give
up its claim and recognize the independence of Kuwait.
The experience of Kuwait may have
increased the anxiety of other gulf leaders about declaring their
independence. Even into the 1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make
claims on territory in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the end of 1971
those states were independent, and nothing came of those claims. Gulf
leaders also faced uncertainty about the form their state should take.
Should they all, with the exception of Oman whose situation was different in
that its treaty relationship with Britain did not guarantee its borders as
did treaties of the other gulf states, band together in the largest entity
possible? Or should they break up into nine separate states, the smallest of
which had little territory, few people, and no oil?
British action forced gulf leaders
to decide. Because of domestic financial concerns, Britain decided in the
late 1960s to eliminate its military commitments east of Suez. As a result,
the gulf shaykhs held a number of meetings to discuss independence.
Initially, leaders considered a state that would include all nine shaykhdoms;
Qatar had even drawn up a constitution to this effect. In the end, however,
so large a federation proved unworkable.
An obstacle to creating a "superstate"
was the status of Bahrain, which had been occupied by Iran at various times.
The shah of Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the island than the
Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the eighteenth century.
Furthermore, the shah indicated that Iran would not accept a federation of
Arab states that included Bahrain.
In the end, the United Nations (UN)
considered the issue of Bahrain; it decided to deny the Iranian claim to the
island and to allow the Bahrainis to form an independent state. Bahrain was
better suited to independence than some of the other shaykhdoms because the
island had been a center of British administration and had a more developed
infrastructure and education system than its neighbors. Ironically, the
greater British presence on Bahrain made residents more resentful of treaty
ties to Britain. Bahrain was the only place in the gulf where demonstrations
against Britain occurred.
Backed by the UN decision, Bahrain
declared its independence on August 15, 1971. On September 3, 1971, Qatar
followed, removing another state from any potential federation. Although
Qatar had minimal contact with Britain, it was well suited to independence
because it had a history of support from the Al Saud that went back to the
beginnings of the Wahhabi state. Accordingly, at independence, Qatar could
expect continued support from Saudi Arabia. It could also anticipate
substantial oil revenues that had been increasing since the 1950s.
The same was not true for the other
gulf states. The five southern shaykhdoms--Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ras al
Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn--had little oil in their territory and
so could not afford self-sufficiency as countries. Although substantial
deposits had been discovered in Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, these two states
preferred the security of a confederation rather than independence. Abu
Dhabi, for example, had an outstanding border dispute with Saudi Arabia and
a history of poor relations with that country because of Abu Dhabi's
opposition to Wahhabi Islam. Abu Dhabi might have protected itself by
forming a federation with the five southern shaykhdoms, but this would not
have suited Dubayy. Although Dubayy had oil of its own, its rulers, the Al
Maktum, had a history of hostility toward their relatives in Abu Dhabi, the
Al Nuhayyan, from whom they split in the early nineteenth century. The Al
Maktum would not have liked the Al Nuhayyan to dominate a confederation of
gulf leaders while they were isolated in Dubayy.
Powers beyond the gulf coast also
had an interest in the state to be formed. The Saudis no longer sought to
control the gulf coast, but they remained concerned about stability on the
eastern border. The British and other oil-consuming countries in the West
were similarly concerned, and all parties believed that the largest state
would also be the most stable. Accordingly, many forces were applying
pressure in 1970 to convince the seven shaykhs to stay together.
Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar
became independent, the remaining shaykhs, with the exception of the Al
Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah, took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had
originally drawn up for a nine-member confederation and adapted it to a
six-member body. On December 2, 1971, one day after the British officially
withdrew, these six shaykhdoms declared themselves a sovereign state.
Ras al Khaymah originally refused
to join the confederation. The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a
number of islands and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as
well. In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi sought support for
their claims from Arab states on the peninsula as well as from some Western
powers. When their efforts proved unsuccessful, the Al Qasimi pulled out of
the negotiations. They quickly realized, however, that they could not exist
on their own and joined the union in February 1972.
Oman was never considered a
possible confederation member. Always geographically separate from its
neighbors to the north, Oman had never entered into the agreements with
Britain that governed other gulf rulers. The British had been closely
involved in Oman since the middle of the nineteenth century, but they were
under no official obligation to defend it.
The issue in Oman was one of
internal unity rather than of sovereignty over foreign affairs. The
historical split between coast and interior had continued through the second
half of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth. In 1920
the Al Said sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, came to terms with this split by
granting limited sovereignty to the tribes of the interior. Because of
ambiguous language, the peoples of the interior believed that the treaty cut
them off from the Al Said; the Al Said, however, never gave up their claim
to all of Oman.
The dispute between the two groups
was exacerbated by the exploration for oil, which began in Oman in 1924. The
oil fields lay in the interior, and the oil companies negotiated for access
to them with the Al Said in Muscat. This Al Said sultan gladly sold them
rights to the Omani oil fields, although the tribes of the interior claimed
sovereignty over the area. When the oil men went inland to explore, they
were attacked by the tribes, whom the sultan considered to be rebels,
leading the oil companies to complain to the British government. Their
complaints encouraged the British to continue their aid to the sultan,
hoping that he would pacify the area and ensure Western access to Omani oil.
The sultan was eventually
successful. In 1957 forces loyal to Said ibn Taimur captured the town of
Nazwah, which the Al Said had not controlled since the nineteenth century.
In 1958 the sultan withdrew to his palace in the coastal city of Salalah in
Dhofar, a southern province that the Al Said had annexed in the nineteenth
century, and took little interest in maintaining stability in the country.
While keeping his military relationship with the British, he restricted
Oman's contact with the rest of the world, discouraged development, and
prohibited political reform.
In the end, the Al Said control
over a united Oman survived, but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the
sultan had partially reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he
was unable to handle the increasing complexity of domestic politics. By the
1960s, Omani affairs had become international issues. Western oil companies
sought to work in the interior of the country, and foreign governments, such
as the Marxist state of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, were
sending arms to the rebels in Dhofar.
The Al Said hold over the region
remained problematic, however, and in 1964 another rebellion arose, this
time in Dhofar. The Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under control
until 1976, obliged the sultan to seek foreign military assistance;
therefore, British forces, particularly the air force, resumed action in the
country. The rebels pointed to British involvement as an indication of the
sultan's illegitimacy and brought their case to the UN, which eventually
censured Britain for its continuing involvement in Oman.
Said ibn Taimur's policies
frustrated many, not only in Oman but also in Britain, whose citizens were
heavily involved in the sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By
1970 these elements decided they could bear with the situation no longer; a
coalition of Omani military and civilian forces, as well as British forces,
attacked the palace and forced Said ibn Taimur to abdicate. They replaced
him with his son, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, who had played no role in Said ibn
Taimur's government. The sultan had actually locked his son in the palace
for fear that Qabus ibn Said, who had been educated in Britain, would
challenge his archconservative policies.
On his release, Qabus ibn Said
consolidated the sultanate's hold over the interior and then solicited
regional rather than British help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other
Arab leaders, as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman in response
to Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of this coalition, by 1976 the
sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion.
Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi
imam as the first rulers in his line had been, but in 1970 this was less
important than it had been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's
population was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern mountains. Furthermore,
the province of Dhofar had a relatively short history of association with
the rest of Oman. |
